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Jan., 1952
CASE COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS -TO WHAT EXTENT WILL OR
SHOULD THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE FORUM BE AP-
PLIED IN A CAUSE OF ACTION ARISING IN ANOTHER
JURISDICTION ?-Basing his complaint on the Illinois wrongful
death statute, the plaintiff brought an action in the Wisconsin
state court to recover from the defendants for wrongful death re-
sulting from injuries sustained in an automobile accident in Illi-
nois. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the merits, hold-
ing that the Wisconsin wrongful death act which provides that
"such action be brought for a death caused in this case," estab-
lishes a local public policy against Wisconsin entertaining suits
brought under the wrongful death statutes of other states. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. Held: Reversed, with four
Justices dissenting. The Wisconsin statutory policy which would
exclude the Illinois cause of action involved was forbidden by the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. Hughes v.
Fetter, 71 S. Ct. 980 (1951).
From cases in which the public policy of the forum was de-
clared predominate where in conflict with applicable foreign stat-
utes without discussing the constitutional issue raised by the full
faith and credit clause,' the Supreme Court has, by a rather spas-
modic process, gradually narrowed the power of the states to re-
fuse, on grounds of public policy, to enforce rights arising under
statutes of a sister state. Prior to the decision in the instant case,
the rights given by a foreign statute were declared superior to local
policy where the forum's interest was "insufficient". 2 This seems
to stem from the idea that local policy becomes important only
when the transaction is domestic, 3 or where the interest of the
forum is superior when weighed with that of the foreign jurisdic-
tion.4 While Hughes v. Fetter has not made particularly definite
the extent to which the forum must give recognition to the extra-
territorial statutes conflicting with local policy, it does appear that
use has been made of a more comprehensive test than previously
employed; not only was there a "balancing of interests," but also,
a critical inquiry was made as to the value of the local policy.5 The
result that will be reached when other local policies of exclusion
IE.g., Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412, 62 L. ed. 368 (1918).
'Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 79 L. ed. 1100, 55 S. Ct. 589 (1935);
Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 56 L. ed. 749, 32 S. Ct. 415 (1912).
' Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express Co., 314 U.S. 201 (1941).
'Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
8 Justice Cardozo seems to have indicated that such an inquiry should be
made when he said, "[the courts] are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign
right .. . unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal." Loucks v. Standard Oil of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
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are tested is uncertain. Only a few types of statutes are entitled
to full faith and credit under existing decisions.6 In spite of the
general language used, it would be a mistake to assume that Hughes
v. Fetter has done any more than indicate that the Supreme Court
will carefully consider the validity of a local policy excluding rights




DEEDS-GRANTEES TAKE AS TENANTS BY
THE ENTIRETIES.
Land was deeded to "Francis Lucas, a single man, and Joseph
Lucas and Matilda Lucas, his wife." Francis Lucas was the son
of the other two grantees. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that the husband and wife took their moiety as tenants by
the entireties, and that the son had a one-half interest in the
property.1
The court used the following language:
... [A] conveyance to three parties two of whom are
husband and wife but neither designated as such, shall,
in the absence of any language in the conveyance disclos-
ing a contrary intention, be deemed a conveyance of one
third shares.... But the intention is the cardinal and con-
trolling element,2 and if intention that the husband and
wife shall take as such [i.e. by entireties] sufficiently ap-
pears, it will be given effect.
From the above mentioned words of conveyance, the court
found sufficient intention that a tenancy by the entireties be cre-
ated, saying that the phrase "his wife" in the deed indicated that
the parties attached significance to the marital status.
The question arises, then, as to how the Colorado court would
interpret language in a deed similar to that involved in the Heatter
case; but there appear to be no Colorado cases passing on the
precise point.
In Whyman v. Johnston et al.2 the holding that, in the ab-
(a) Stockholder's liability suits: Order of United Commercial Travelers
of the World v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 67 S. Ct. 1355 (1947) ; Broderick v. Rosner,
Supra. (b) Charters and by-laws of beneficial fraternal organizations: Modern
Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925). (c) Employers liability
statutes: Tennessee Coal & R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914). (d) Work-
men's compensation acts: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943),
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). (e) Statutes gov-
erning insurance contracts: John Hancock Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299
U.S. 178 (1936); Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292
U.S. 143 (1934). (f) And, after Hughes v. Fetters, wrongful death statutes.
ICompare Broderick v. Rosner, Supra, and Clark v. Willard, 294 U.S. 211
(1935), cases decided in the same year and yet almost incapable of being re-
conciled if the language of Broderick v. Rosner be taken literally.
IHeatter v. Lucas et al., 367 Pa. 296, 80 A. 2d 749 (1951).
Italics by the court.
3 62 Colo. 461, 163 P. 76 (1917).
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sence of a showing in the conveyance of intention by the grantor,
no estate by the entireties is created when land is conveyed to
spouses. In that case, land was deeded to husband and wife by
their names only, with no indication of what type tenancy was
intended. Whether the parties were referred to as husband and
wife does not appear from the court's opinion. There would seem
to be no reason why the result would be different, insofar as it
relates to the question of tenancy by the entireties, if a third
grantee were involved.
Whether the Colorado court would hold that an estate by the
entireties was created where the intention to create such an es-
tate is shown is a point on which there has been no decision,
although many attorneys feel that the question has been resolved
by the Whyman case. This belief on the part of lawyers is based
upon the dictum in the case to the effect that, after the passage
of the Married Women's Act, the reason for the common law rule
creating estates by the entireties ceased to exist, and upon the
head-note to the case which makes the statement that the Married
Women's Act abolished estates by the entireties. This interpreta-
tion of the case may, however, be too broad in view of the fact
that the deed there involved expressed no intention as to what
type of tenancy was meant to result.
Perhaps some indication that tenancies by the entireties still
exist is to be found in the Inheritance Tax Act of 1933,4 where
reference is made to property held in tenancy by the entireties; but
any such implication would appear to be nullified by the 1947
amendment 5 to the portion of the tax statute referred to, which
omitted the reference to the type estate in question.
The writers of this comment conclude that an estate by the
entireties definitely cannot be created in Colorado where no inten-
tion to create such appears; whether such estates continue to exist
and may be created by a showing of intention that such be created





Richard H. Shaw and Clayton D. Knowles announce the re-
moval of their offices from the Denver National Building to Suite
301 Equitable Building in Denver.
COLO. LAws, C. 106, p. 558 (1933).
'COLO. LAWS, C. 212, p. 537 (1947).
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